000			02236cam a22003377 4500
001			w13557
003			NBER
005			20211020111922.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2007 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aCurrie, Janet. _98688
245	1	0	_aTransfers in Cash and In Kind: _bTheory Meets the Data / _cJanet Currie, Firouz Gahvari.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2007.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w13557
500			_aOctober 2007.
520	3		_aWe review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the "Samaritan's Dilemma", pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs, but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aH4 - Publicly Provided Goods _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aH5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aGahvari, Firouz. _910910
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w13557.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13557
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13557
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c334566 _d293128