000 02267cam a22003617 4500
001 w13066
003 NBER
005 20211020112047.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2007 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aLang, Kevin.
_914856
245 1 0 _aWorker Sorting, Taxes and Health Insurance Coverage /
_cKevin Lang, Hong Kang.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2007.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w13066
500 _aApril 2007.
520 3 _aWe develop a model in which firms hire heterogeneous workers but must offer all workers insurance benefits under similar terms. In equilibrium, some firms offer free health insurance, some require an employee premium payment and some do not offer insurance. Making the employee contribution pre-tax lowers the cost to workers of a given employee premium and encourages more firms to charge. This increases the offer rate, lowers the take-up rate, increases (decreases) coverage among high (low) demand groups, with an indeterminate overall effect. We test the model using the expansion of section 125 plans between 1987 and 1996. The results are generally supportive.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aH22 - Incidence
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aH24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aI11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aJ32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits • Retirement Plans • Private Pensions
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aKang, Hong.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w13066.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13066
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13066
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c335064
_d293626