000			01949cam a22003377 4500
001			w13040
003			NBER
005			20211020112051.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2007 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aKrishna, Kala.
245	1	0	_aTrade Policy with Heterogeneous Traders: _bDo Quotas Get a Bum Rap? / _cKala Krishna, Ling H. Tan.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2007.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w13040
500			_aApril 2007.
520	3		_aThis paper considers the effects of trade policy--tariffs and quotas--when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post. We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its head: quotas are not as bad for welfare as previously believed, while tariffs may restrict trade by more than originally intended. Furthermore, the allocation of property rights (quota licenses) has real effects beyond the distribution of rents; this, in turn, has implications for the effects of corruption on welfare.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aF1 - Trade _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aF18 - Trade and Environment _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aTan, Ling H.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w13040.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13040
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13040
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c335090 _d293652