000			02149cam a22003257 4500
001			w13031
003			NBER
005			20211020112054.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2007 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aGlaeser, Edward L. _911455
245	1	0	_aAggregation Reversals and the Social Formation of Beliefs / _cEdward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2007.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w13031
500			_aApril 2007.
520	3		_aIn the past two elections, richer people were more likely to vote Republican while richer states were more likely to vote Democratic. This switch is an aggregation reversal, where an individual relationship, like income and Republicanism, is reversed at some level of aggregation. Aggregation reversals can occur when an independent variable impacts an outcome both directly and indirectly through a correlation with beliefs. For example, income increases the desire for low taxes but decreases belief in Republican social causes. If beliefs are learned socially, then aggregation can magnify the connection between the independent variable and beliefs, which can cause an aggregation reversal. We estimate the model's parameters for three examples of aggregation reversals, and show with these parameters that the model predicts the observed reversals.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aA1 - General Economics _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aSacerdote, Bruce. _919970
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w13031.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13031
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13031
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c335100 _d293662