000			01932cam a22003137 4500
001			w12174
003			NBER
005			20211020112321.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2006 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aFryer, Roland G, Jr.
245	1	0	_aBelief Flipping in a Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination / _cRoland G. Fryer, Jr..
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2006.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w12174
500			_aApril 2006.
520	3		_aThe literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex-ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria. This paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm. The worker's welfare implications (i.e. who benefits from an employer's discriminatory hiring practices) are unclear. Even though agents face discrimination initially, some may be better off because of it.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aJ7 - Labor Discrimination _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w12174.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w12174
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12174
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c335972 _d294534