000			02167cam a22003377 4500
001			w10706
003			NBER
005			20211020112727.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2004 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aHeal, Geoffrey. _912549
245	1	0	_aInterdependent Security: _bA General Model / _cGeoffrey Heal, Howard Kunreuther.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2004.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w10706
500			_aAugust 2004.
520	3		_aIn an interdependent world the risks faced by any one agent depend not only on its choices but also on those of all others. Expectations about others' choices will influence investments in risk-management, and the outcome can be sub-optimal investment all round. We model this as the Nash equilibrium of a game and give conditions for such a sub-optimal equilibrium to be tipped to an optimal one. We also characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest critical coalition, so that there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub- optimal to the optimal equilibrium. We illustrate these results by reference to airline security, the control of infectious diseases via vaccination and investment in research and development.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aC72 - Noncooperative Games _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD80 - General _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aKunreuther, Howard. _914669
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w10706.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w10706
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10706
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c337461 _d296023