| 000 | 02524cam a22003377 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | w10221 | ||
| 003 | NBER | ||
| 005 | 20211020112844.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
| 008 | 210910s2004 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aOyer, Paul. _918024 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCompensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: _bA Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash / _cPaul Oyer, Scott Schaefer. |
| 260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2004. |
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_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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| 490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w10221 |
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| 500 | _aJanuary 2004. | ||
| 520 | 3 | _aUsing a detailed data set of employee stock option grants, we compare observed stock-option-based pay plans to hypothetical cash-only or restricted-stock-based plans. We make a variety of assumptions regarding the possible benefits of options relative to cash or stock, and then use observed option grants to make inferences regarding firms' decisions to issue options to lower-level employees. If the favorable accounting treatment is the sole reason underlying firms' choices of options over cash-only compensation, then we estimate that the median firm in our data set incurs $0.64 in real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax income by $1. This figure is several times larger than the willingness-to-pay for earnings reported by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2002), who study firms that (allegedly) commit fraud in order to boost earnings. If, on the other hand, firms' option-granting decisions are driven by economic-profit maximization then observed stock option grants are most consistent with explanations involving attraction and retention of employees. | |
| 530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
| 538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
| 538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
| 588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
| 690 | 7 |
_aJ31 - Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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| 690 | 7 |
_aJ33 - Compensation Packages • Payment Methods _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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| 700 | 1 | _aSchaefer, Scott. | |
| 710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
| 830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w10221. |
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| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w10221 |
| 856 |
_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10221 |
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_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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_c337950 _d296512 |
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