000			02567cam a22003137 4500
001			w9449
003			NBER
005			20211020113050.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2003 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aLevitt, Steven D. _915217
245	1	0	_aTesting Theories of Discrimination: _bEvidence from "Weakest Link" / _cSteven D. Levitt.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2003.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w9449
500			_aJanuary 2003.
520	3		_aIn most settings, it is difficult to measure discrimination, and even more challenging to distinguish between competing theories of discrimination (taste-based versus information-based). Using contestant voting behavior on the television game show Weakest Link, one can in principle empirically address both of these questions. On the show, contestants answer questions and vote off other players, competing for a winner-take-all prize. In early rounds, strategic incentives encourage voting for the weakest competitors. In later rounds, the incentives reverse, and the strongest competitors become the logical target. Controlling for other observable characteristics including the number of correct answers thus far, both theories of discrimination predict that in early rounds, excess votes will be made against groups targeted for discrimination. In later rounds, however, taste-based models predict continued excess votes, whereas statistical discrimination predicts fewer votes against the target group. Empirically, I find some evidence of information-based discrimination towards Hispanics (i.e., other players perceive them as having low ability) and taste-based discrimination against older players (i.e., other players treat them with animus). There is little in the data to suggest discrimination against women and Blacks.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aJ71 - Discrimination _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w9449.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w9449
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9449
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c338731 _d297293