000			02676cam a22003377 4500
001			w9173
003			NBER
005			20211020113136.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2002 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aNelson, Jonathan Katz. _933064
245	1	2	_aA Renaissance Instrument to Support Nonprofits: _bThe Sale of Private Chapels in Florentine Churches / _cJonathan Katz Nelson, Richard J. Zeckhauser.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2002.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w9173
500			_aSeptember 2002.
520	3		_aCatholic churches in Renaissance Florence supported themselves overwhelmingly from the contributions of wealthy citizens. The sale of private chapels within churches to individuals was a significant source of church funds, and facilitated a church construction boom. Chapel sales offered three benefits to churches: prices were usually far above cost; donor/purchasers purchased masses and other tie-in services; and they added to the magnificence of the church because donors were required to decorate chapels expensively. Donors purchased chapels for two primary reasons: to facilitate services for themselves and their families, such as masses and church burials, that would speed their departure from Purgatory; and to gain status in the community. Chapels were private property within churches, but were only occasionally used directly by their owners. The expense of chapels and their decorations made them an ideal signal for wealth, particularly since sumptuary laws limited most displays of wealth. To overcome the contributions free-rider problem, these churches sold private benefits not readily available elsewhere, namely status and salvation.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aL31 - Nonprofit Institutions • NGOs • Social Entrepreneurship _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aZeckhauser, Richard J. _923263
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w9173.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w9173
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9173
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c339014 _d297576