000			01924cam a22003377 4500
001			w6498
003			NBER
005			20211020113902.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s1998 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aTornell, Aaron.
245	1	0	_aVoracity and Growth / _cAaron Tornell, Philip R. Lane.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c1998.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w6498
500			_aApril 1998.
520	3		_aWe analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure an dis populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect,' by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aF43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO10 - General _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aLane, Philip R.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w6498.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w6498
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6498
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c341781 _d300343