000 02329cam a22003257 4500
001 w2015
003 NBER
005 20211020115104.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s1986 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aBernanke, Ben S.
245 1 0 _aAgency Costs, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations /
_cBen S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c1986.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w2015
500 _aSeptember 1986.
520 3 _aBad economic times are typically associated with a high incidence of financial distress, e.g., insolvency and bankruptcy. This paper studies the role of changes in borrower solvency in the initiation and propagation of the business cycle. We first develop a model of the process of financing real investment projects under asymmetric information, extending work by Robert Townsend. A major conclusion here is that when the entrepreneurs who borrow to finance projects are more solvent (have more "collateral"), the deadweight agency costs of investment finance are lower. This model of investment finance is then embedded in a dynamic macroeconomic setting. We show that, first, since reductions in collateral in bad times increase the agency costs of borrowing, which in turn depress the demand for investment, the presence of these financial factors will tend to amplify swings in real output. Second, we find that autonomous factors which affect the collateral of borrowers (as in a "debt-deflation") can actually initiate cycles in output.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aE - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aGertler, Mark.
_911300
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w2015.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w2015
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2015
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c346532
_d305094