000			01892cam a22003137 4500
001			w1304
003			NBER
005			20211020115247.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s1984 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aGreenwald, Bruce C. _911850
245	1	0	_aPecuniary & Market Mediated Externalities: _bTowards a General Theory of the Welfare Economics & Economies with Imperfect Information & Incomplete Mrkts / _cBruce C. Greenwald, Joseph E. Stiglitz.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c1984.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w1304
500			_aMarch 1984.
520	3		_aThis paper presents a simple but quite general framework for analyzing the impact of informational externalities. By identifying the traditional pecuniary effect of these externalities which nets out,the paper greatly simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions can be Pareto improving. In some cases it also leads to simple tests, based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of a particular tax policy. The framework of the paper is used to analyze adverse selection, signalling, moral hazard, incomplete contingent claim markets and queue rationing equilibria.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
700	1		_aStiglitz, Joseph E.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w1304.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w1304
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1304
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c347268 _d305830