000 02476cam a22003257 4500
001 w0927
003 NBER
005 20211020115344.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s1982 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aBulow, Jeremy I.
_97030
245 1 0 _aEconomic Implications of ERISA /
_cJeremy I. Bulow, Myron S. Scholes, Peter Menell.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c1982.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w0927
500 _aJuly 1982.
520 3 _aIf the intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA, was to assure that beneficiaries of insolvent pension plans receive adequate pension benefits, sharp increases in nominal rates of interest have blunted that purpose. Without an increase in these rates, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC, the insurance agency established to guarantee benefits, faced large liabilities on the terminations of pension plans. We examine the economics of pension funds and the funding of pension funds before and after the enactment of ERISA. The Act changed the economics of pension funds. The PBGC, the employer, and the employees have interests in the assets of the pension plan. The PBGC can tax corporations to pay off liabilities and to fund guaranteed benefits; employers can terminate pension plans or overfund them; employees can ask for more benefits or claim the assets in the fund. Although the PBGC insures benefits, the insurance agent forbears, not acting quickly to protect its own interests. To prevent potential huge increases in its liabilities, the PBGC could require that employers hedge the guaranteed benefits, and fund their increases in promised benefits. Given its policies, these requirements could protect the PBGC.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
700 1 _aScholes, Myron S.
_920380
700 1 _aMenell, Peter.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w0927.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w0927
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w0927
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c347657
_d306219