000			01683cam a22003017 4500
001			w0623
003			NBER
005			20211020115430.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s1981 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aGreen, Jerry R. _911818
245	1	0	_aWage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675) / _cJerry R. Green.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c1981.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w0623
500			_a1981.
520	3		_aThis paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. However, employment is above rather than below the efficient level when the conditions of profitability are worse than average. Such a one- period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as it is traditionally conceived.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w0623.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w0623
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w0623
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c347977 _d306539