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001 978-3-030-39691-6
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020 _a9783030396916
_9978-3-030-39691-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-030-39691-6
_2doi
050 4 _aHB846-846.8
072 7 _aKCA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS069030
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072 7 _aKCA
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082 0 4 _a302.1
100 1 _aTangian, Andranik.
_eauthor.
_0(orcid)0000-0002-3939-0013
_1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3939-0013
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 0 _aAnalytical Theory of Democracy
_h[electronic resource] :
_bHistory, Mathematics and Applications /
_cby Andranik Tangian.
250 _a1st ed. 2020.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2020.
300 _aXXV, 1048 p. 89 illus., 54 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
505 0 _aHistory -- Mathematics -- Applications.
520 _aThis book operationalizes the idea of political representation, which is fundamental to modern democracies. Both individual representatives and representative bodies are evaluated using the indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population whose opinion is represented on topical policy issues) and universality (the percentage of issues for which the prevailing public opinion is represented). Viewed as objective functions, these indices can aid in the search for optimal representatives and representative bodies. By replacing the consistency analysis of the social choice axioms with the calculation of the best compromises, the paradoxes of social choice, such as those of Condorcet and Arrow, can be overcome. These indices also form the core of an alternative election method that is aimed at enhancing policy representation - a recent concept of political representation, which is not supported by the conventional voting systems shaped during the American and French Revolutions. This method is tested in a series of election experiments that focus on implementation details. In addition, non-societal applications such as MCDM, finance or traffic control are considered, where the objects that reflect the properties or behavior of other objects are regarded as their "representatives." Given its scope, the book will appeal to political scientists, economists and operations researchers, as well as to politicians interested in improving democratic performance and electoral system design.
650 0 _aWelfare economics.
_933859
650 0 _aDemocracy.
650 0 _aGame theory.
650 0 _aEconomic theory.
650 1 4 _aSocial Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W31020
650 2 4 _aDemocracy.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911050
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/M13011
650 2 4 _aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29000
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783030396909
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783030396923
830 0 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
856 4 0 _uhttps://s443-doi-org.br.lsproxy.net/10.1007/978-3-030-39691-6
912 _aZDB-2-ECF
912 _aZDB-2-SXEF
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