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020 _a9783662469507
_9978-3-662-46950-7
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7
_2doi
050 4 _aHB144
072 7 _aPBUD
_2bicssc
072 7 _aMAT011000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aPBUD
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082 0 4 _a519.3
100 1 _aPeters, Hans.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 0 _aGame Theory
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Multi-Leveled Approach /
_cby Hans Peters.
250 _a2nd ed. 2015.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2015.
300 _aXVII, 494 p. 89 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringer Texts in Business and Economics,
_x2192-4333
505 0 _aIntroduction -- Part I Thinking Strategically -- Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Games -- Finite Two-Person Games -- Finite Extensive Form Games -- Finite Games with Incomplete Information -- Noncooperative Games: Extensions -- Repeated Games -- An Introduction to Evolutionary Games -- Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility -- Cooperative Game Models -- Social Choice -- Part II Noncooperative Games -- Matrix Games -- Finite Games -- Extensive Form Games -- Evolutionary Games -- Part III Cooperative Games -- TU-Games: Dominationa, Stable Sets, and the Core -- The Shapley Value -- Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Set -- The Nucleolus -- Special Transferable Utility Games -- Bargaining Problems -- Part IV Tools.
520 _aThis textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
650 0 _aGame theory.
650 0 _aOperations research.
650 0 _aDecision making.
650 0 _aMicroeconomics.
650 1 4 _aGame Theory.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29020
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/M13011
650 2 4 _aOperations Research/Decision Theory.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/521000
650 2 4 _aMicroeconomics.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W31000
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783662469491
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783662469514
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783662518779
830 0 _aSpringer Texts in Business and Economics,
_x2192-4333
856 4 0 _uhttps://s443-doi-org.br.lsproxy.net/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
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