000			03931nam a22006015i 4500
001			978-3-642-03107-6
003			DE-He213
005			20210420094335.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			101112s2011 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783642031076 _9978-3-642-03107-6
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6 _2doi
050		4	_aHB1-846.8
072		7	_aKCA _2bicssc
072		7	_aBUS069030 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aKCA _2thema
082	0	4	_a330.1
100	1		_aGehrlein, William V. _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245	1	0	_aVoting Paradoxes and Group Coherence _h[electronic resource] : _bThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules / _cby William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
250			_a1st ed. 2011.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2011.
300			_aXII, 385 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aStudies in Choice and Welfare, _x1614-0311
505	0		_aVoting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities -- Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence -- Other Incompability Paradoxes -- Other Voting Paradoxes -- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity -- Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis -- Other Characteristics of Voting Rules -- The Significance of Voting Rule Selection -- Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.
520			_aThe likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters' preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters' preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
650		0	_aEconomic theory.
650		0	_aPolitical economy.
650		0	_aPublic finance.
650		0	_aPolitical science.
650		0	_aGame theory.
650	1	4	_aEconomic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. _0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29000
650	2	4	_aInternational Political Economy. _0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912140
650	2	4	_aPublic Economics. _0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W34000
650	2	4	_aPolitical Science. _0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/911000
650	2	4	_aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. _0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/M13011
700	1		_aLepelley, Dominique. _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer Nature eBook
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783642031083
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783642266102
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783642031069
830		0	_aStudies in Choice and Welfare, _x1614-0311
856	4	0	_uhttps://s443-doi-org.br.lsproxy.net/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
912			_aZDB-2-SBE
912			_aZDB-2-SXEF
942			_2ddc _cEBK
999			_c382074 _d340636