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001 978-3-7908-2020-1
003 DE-He213
005 20210420094353.0
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008 100301s2008 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783790820201
_9978-3-7908-2020-1
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1
_2doi
050 4 _aHD72-88
072 7 _aKCM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS092000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aKCM
_2thema
082 0 4 _a338.9
100 1 _aBüchelhofer, Christian.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 0 _aCorporate Control and Enterprise Reform in China
_h[electronic resource] :
_bAn Econometric Analysis of Block Share Trades /
_cby Christian Büchelhofer.
250 _a1st ed. 2008.
264 1 _aHeidelberg :
_bPhysica-Verlag HD :
_bImprint: Physica,
_c2008.
300 _aXI, 115 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aContributions to Economics,
_x1431-1933
505 0 _aChina's reform process, stock market development, and testable hypotheses -- Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control -- Causes of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership -- Conclusion.
520 _aThis study sheds light on the efficiency of corporate control allocation in Chinese listed firms. Using a panel data set for the period 1996 to 2006, it examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in corporate control. The results indicate that poorly performing firms are the predominant targets of control changes; shareholder and creditor control generally act as a complement for changes in control. Following the change in ownership there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring and an improvement in operating performance. Significant differences in these dimensions emerge, however, between State and private transfers of control. The findings not only provide insights into the motives and constraints of the key players involved in governance practices in China; but they also contain useful implications for other emerging markets around the world that have weak legal systems and weak property rights protection.
650 0 _aDevelopment economics.
650 0 _aIndustrial organization.
650 0 _aFinance.
650 1 4 _aDevelopment Economics.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W42000
650 2 4 _aIndustrial Organization.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W31010
650 2 4 _aFinance, general.
_0https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/600000
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783790825466
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783790822939
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783790820195
830 0 _aContributions to Economics,
_x1431-1933
856 4 0 _uhttps://s443-doi-org.br.lsproxy.net/10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
912 _aZDB-2-SXEF
942 _2ddc
_cEBK
999 _c382181
_d340743