000			02903cam a22003737 4500
001			w28661
003			NBER
005			20211020103232.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2021 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aHaghtalab, Nika.
245	1	0	_aPersuading with Anecdotes / _cNika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2021.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w28661
500			_aApril 2021.
520	3		_aWe study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender has access to a collection of n samples correlated with the state of the world, which we think of as specific anecdotes or pieces of evidence, and can send exactly one of these samples to the receiver in order to influence her choice of action. Importantly, the sender's personal preferences may differ from the receiver's, which affects the seller's strategic choice of which anecdote to send.
520	3		_aWe show that if the sender's communication scheme is observable to the receiver (that is, the choice of which anecdote to send given the set they receive), then they will choose an unbiased and maximally informative communication scheme, no matter the difference in preferences. Without observability, however, even a small difference in preferences can lead to a significant bias in the choice of anecdote, which the receiver must then account for. This can significantly reduce the informativeness of the signal, leading to substantial utility loss for both sides. One implication is informational homophily: a receiver can rationally prefer to obtain information from a poorly-informed sender with aligned preferences, rather than a knowledgeable expert whose preferences may differ from her own.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aG4 - Behavioral Finance _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aImmorlica, Nicole.
700	1		_aLucier, Brendan.
700	1		_aMobius, Markus. _933194
700	1		_aMohan, Divyarthi.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w28661.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28661
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28661
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c388168 _d346730