000 | 03357cam a22005537a 4500 | ||
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001 | w30283 | ||
003 | NBER | ||
005 | 20221003144424.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 221003s2022 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
040 |
_aMaCbNBER _beng _cMaCbNBER |
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100 | 1 | _aCicala, Steve. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aAdverse Selection as a Policy Instrument: _bUnraveling Climate Change / _cSteve Cicala, David Hémous, Morten G. Olsen. |
260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2022. |
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300 |
_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w30283 |
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500 | _aJuly 2022. | ||
520 | 3 | _aThis paper applies principles of adverse selection to overcome obstacles that prevent the implementation of Pigouvian policies to internalize externalities. Focusing on negative externalities from production (such as pollution), we consider settings in which aggregate emissions are known, but individual contributions are unobserved by the government. We evaluate a policy that gives firms the option to pay a tax on their voluntarily and verifiably disclosed emissions, or pay an output tax based on the average rate of emissions among the undisclosed firms. The certification of relatively clean firms raises the output-based tax, setting off a process of unraveling in favor of disclosure. We derive sufficient statistics formulas to calculate the welfare of such a program relative to mandatory output or emissions taxes. We find that the voluntary certification mechanism would deliver significant gains over output-based taxation in two empirical applications: methane emissions from oil and gas fields, and carbon emissions from imported steel. | |
530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
690 | 7 |
_aAsymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aAsymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design _2jelc |
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084 |
_aD82 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue _2jelc |
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084 |
_aH2 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aInternational Fiscal Issues • International Public Goods _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aInternational Fiscal Issues • International Public Goods _2jelc |
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084 |
_aH87 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aEnergy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aEnergy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law _2jelc |
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084 |
_aK32 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aEconomics of Regulation _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aEconomics of Regulation _2jelc |
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084 |
_aL51 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aClimate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aClimate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming _2jelc |
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084 |
_aQ54 _2jelc |
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700 | 1 | _aHémous, David. | |
700 | 1 | _aOlsen, Morten G. | |
710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w30283. |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w30283 |
856 |
_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30283 |
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942 |
_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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999 |
_c389912 _d348474 |