000			03160cam a22004097a 4500
001			w30252
003			NBER
005			20221003144430.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			221003s2022 mau fo 000 0 eng d
040			_aMaCbNBER _beng _cMaCbNBER
100	1		_aSkandalis, Daphné.
245	1	0	_aRacial Inequality in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance System / _cDaphné Skandalis, Ioana Marinescu, Maxim N. Massenkoff.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2022.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w30252
500			_aJuly 2022.
520	3		_aThe U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) system operates as a federal-state partnership, where states have considerable autonomy to decide on specific UI rules. This has allowed for systematically stricter rules in states with a larger Black population. We study how these differences in state rules create a gap in the unemployment insurance that Black and White unemployed workers receive. Using administrative data from random audits on UI claims in all states, we first document a large racial gap in the UI that unemployed workers receive after filing a new claim. Black claimants receive an 18% lower replacement rate (i.e., benefits relative to prior wage, including denials) than White claimants. In principle, the replacement rate of each claimant mechanically depends on the rules prevailing in her state and on her work history (e.g., the earnings before job loss and the reason for separation from prior employer). Since we observe claimants' UI-relevant work history and state, we are in a unique position to identify the role of each factor. After accounting for Black-White differences in work history, differences in rules across states create an 8% Black-White gap in replacement rate (i.e., slightly less than half of the overall gap). Using a standard welfare calculation, we show that states with the largest shares of Black workers would gain the most from having more generous UI rules. Altogether, our results highlight that disparate state rules in the UI institution create racial inequality without maximizing overall welfare.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aUnemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings _2jelc
650		7	_aUnemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant Closings _2jelc
084			_aJ65 _2jelc
690		7	_aLabor Discrimination _2jelc
650		7	_aLabor Discrimination _2jelc
084			_aJ7 _2jelc
700	1		_aMarinescu, Ioana.
700	1		_aMassenkoff, Maxim N.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w30252.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w30252
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30252
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c389943 _d348505