000 | 02871cam a22004697a 4500 | ||
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001 | w30794 | ||
003 | NBER | ||
005 | 20230116102903.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 230116s2022 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
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_aMaCbNBER _beng _cMaCbNBER |
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100 | 1 | _aCampbell, Joseph. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aLiquid Democracy. Two Experiments on Delegation in Voting / _cJoseph Campbell, Alessandra Casella, Lucas de Lara, Victoria R. Mooers, Dilip Ravindran. |
260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2022. |
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_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w30794 |
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500 | _aDecember 2022. | ||
520 | 3 | _aUnder Liquid Democracy (LD), decisions are taken by referendum, but voters are allowed to delegate their votes to other voters. Theory shows that in common interest problems where experts are correctly identified, the outcome can be superior to simple majority voting. However, even when experts are correctly identified, delegation must be used sparely because it reduces the variety of independent information sources. We report the results of two experiments, each studying two treatments: in one treatment, participants have the option of delegating to better informed individuals; in the second, participants can choose to abstain. The first experiment follows a tightly controlled design planned for the lab; the second is a perceptual task run online where information about signals' precision is ambiguous. The two designs are very different, but the experiments reach the same result: in both, delegation rates are unexpectedly high and higher than abstention rates, and LD underperforms relative to both universal voting and abstention. | |
530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
690 | 7 |
_aLaboratory, Group Behavior _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aLaboratory, Group Behavior _2jelc |
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084 |
_aC92 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making _2jelc |
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084 |
_aD7 _2jelc |
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690 | 7 |
_aInformation, Knowledge, and Uncertainty _2jelc |
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650 | 7 |
_aInformation, Knowledge, and Uncertainty _2jelc |
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084 |
_aD8 _2jelc |
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700 | 1 |
_aCasella, Alessandra. _97530 |
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700 | 1 | _ade Lara, Lucas. | |
700 | 1 | _aMooers, Victoria R. | |
700 | 1 | _aRavindran, Dilip. | |
710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w30794. |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w30794 |
856 |
_yAcceso en lĂnea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30794 |
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_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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_c390493 _d349055 |