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Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publication details: Cambridge ; London : The MIT Press, 1993.Description: xxiii, 579 páginas : gráficas, tablas ; 26 cmContent type:
  • Texto
Media type:
  • Sin mediación
Carrier type:
  • Volumen
ISBN:
  • 0262061414
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 519.3  F83g 21
Other classification:
  • C70
Contents:
I. Static games of complete information ; 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium ; 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information ; 3. Extensive-form games ; 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions ; 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information ; 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium ; 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information ; 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection ; 9. Reputation effects ; 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics ; 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance ; 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games ; 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium ; 14. Common knowledge and games.
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Holdings
Item type Home library Call number Status Notes Date due Barcode Item holds
LIBRO FISICO Biblioteca Principal 519.3 F83g (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not For Loan Mantener en colección 29004018968544
Total holds: 0

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I. Static games of complete information ; 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium ; 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information ; 3. Extensive-form games ; 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions ; 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information ; 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium ; 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information ; 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection ; 9. Reputation effects ; 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics ; 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance ; 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games ; 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium ; 14. Common knowledge and games.

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