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The Effect of Price Advertising and Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart / Jeffrey Milyo, Joel Waldfogel.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w6488.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1998.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: In May 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Rhode Island's ban on advertising prices of alcoholic beverages, making Rhode Island the subject of a natural experiment for measuring the impact of advertising on prices. Using Massachusetts prices as controls, we find that while advertising stores substantially cut prices of advertised products, prices of other products, at both advertising and non-advertising stores, rise under the advertising regime. We investigate stores' pricing responses to rivals' price advertising and find that small, non-advertising stores raise their prices of products advertised by rivals beyond their baseline price increase, while larger, advertising stores raise by less their prices of rival-advertised products. We find no reductions in price dispersion across stores with the introduction of price advertising. However, those stores that choose to advertise do have lower average prices both before and after the law change. Indirect information on quantities sold, based on Rhode Island Lottery ticket sales, indicate that newspaper-advertising stores draw a higher share of customers after they advertise than before.
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March 1998.

In May 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Rhode Island's ban on advertising prices of alcoholic beverages, making Rhode Island the subject of a natural experiment for measuring the impact of advertising on prices. Using Massachusetts prices as controls, we find that while advertising stores substantially cut prices of advertised products, prices of other products, at both advertising and non-advertising stores, rise under the advertising regime. We investigate stores' pricing responses to rivals' price advertising and find that small, non-advertising stores raise their prices of products advertised by rivals beyond their baseline price increase, while larger, advertising stores raise by less their prices of rival-advertised products. We find no reductions in price dispersion across stores with the introduction of price advertising. However, those stores that choose to advertise do have lower average prices both before and after the law change. Indirect information on quantities sold, based on Rhode Island Lottery ticket sales, indicate that newspaper-advertising stores draw a higher share of customers after they advertise than before.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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