Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate [electronic resource] : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783319740331
- 302.1
- HB846-846.8
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Biblioteca Digital | Colección SPRINGER | 302.1 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
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