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Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate [electronic resource] : Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: SpringerBriefs in EconomicsPublisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2018Edition: 1st ed. 2018Description: XV, 134 p. online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783319740331
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: Printed edition:: No title; Printed edition:: No titleDDC classification:
  • 302.1
LOC classification:
  • HB846-846.8
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
In: Springer Nature eBookSummary: This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
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Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

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