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A political agency theory of central bank independence / Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne. by Series: FMI. Documentos ; 11270 | FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 132/15
Material type: Continuing resource Continuing resource; Type of continuing resource:
Language: English
Publication details: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2003
In: FMI 132 FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 132/15.
Availability: FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 132/15. (1)

Do elections always motivate incumbents? : learning versus re-election concerns / Eric Le Borgne, Ben Lockwood. by Series: CEPR Discussion Paper Series ; 4664 | CEPR. Discussion paper series. IEC ; v. 57/5
Material type: Continuing resource Continuing resource; Type of continuing resource:
Language: English
Publication details: London : Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2004
In: CEPR 57 CEPR. Discussion paper series. IEC ; v. 57/5.
Availability: CEPR. Discussion paper series. IEC ; v. 57/5. (1)

Economic and political determinants of tax amnesties in the U.S. states / Eric Le Borgne. by Series: FMI. Documentos ; 14327 | FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 171/14
Material type: Continuing resource Continuing resource; Type of continuing resource:
Language: English
Publication details: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2006
In: FMI171 FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 171/14.
Availability: FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 171/14. (1)

Dynamic incentives and the optimal delegation of political power / Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne. by Series: FMI. Documentos ; 14780 | FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15
Material type: Continuing resource Continuing resource; Type of continuing resource:
Language: English
Publication details: Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2007
In: FMI 178 FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15.
Availability: FMI. Documentos. IEC ; v. 178/15. (1)

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